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Vyhledat

Japan: Legal Issues in the Unification Church’s Dissolution Verdict. 1. Ignoring United Nations Recommendations

The decision ignored three recommendations from the United Nations, which asked Japan not to limit rights based on “public welfare.”


April 15, 2025


Article 1 of 4

Anti-cult lawyers Katsuomi Abe, Hiroshi Yamaguchi, and Masaki Kito at a press conference following the dissolution verdict. Screenshot.
Anti-cult lawyers Katsuomi Abe, Hiroshi Yamaguchi, and Masaki Kito at a press conference following the dissolution verdict. Screenshot.

On March 25, 2025 the Tokyo District Court ruled on the request by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to dissolve the Japanese branch of the Unification Church, now called Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (“the Family Federation”). This series reviews some issues with the verdict from the point of view of Japanese law.


With regard to whether a tort under the Civil Code constitutes a “violation of laws and regulations” as grounds for dissolution (as opposed to criminal decisions only), the Tokyo District Court followed the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in a non-penal fine decision. As a result, the argument of the Family Federation—that imposing the serious disadvantage of dissolution on a religious corporation based on torts, whose requirements are vague, violates Article 31 of the Constitution—was disregarded.


The notion of “legal norms.”
The notion of “legal norms.”

With regard to the reason why a tort constitutes a “violation of laws and regulations,” the Tokyo District Court simply adopted the Supreme Court’s holding, stating that acts constituting torts are violations of legal norms and thus constitute violations of laws and regulations. However, as shown in the diagram above, “legal norms” is a broader concept that includes not only statutory law but also unwritten legal orders as social norms. 


Therefore, a violation of legal norms does not necessarily amount to a violation of laws and regulations, and such an interpretation is untenable. In fact, the Family Federation has thus far lost civil cases based on tort liability not because of violations of laws and regulations, but because of violations of social norms—such as deviations from “social acceptability.”


Furthermore, if the interpretation of “laws and regulations” in Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Religious Corporations Act is to be understood as a unique concept—different from “laws and regulations” as used in other legal provisions—encompassing not only statutory (positive) law but also unwritten legal orders, then such an interpretation would undermine the uniformity of legal interpretation and compromise legal stability.


[Reference Provision]

Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Religious Corporations Act


When the court finds that any of the following grounds applies to a religious corporation, it may, upon petition by the competent authority, an interested party, or a public prosecutor, or ex officio, order the dissolution of the corporation:


Item 1: The corporation has committed an act that violates laws and regulations and is clearly recognized as seriously harming the public welfare.

The UN Human Rights Committee has, on three occasions—in 2008, 2014, and 2022—recommended to the Japanese government that the ambiguous concept of “public welfare” should not be used to restrict freedom of religious expression. These recommendations are understood to be based on Article 18, Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the interpretation of international law adopted by the United Nations.


Article 18(3) enumerates in an exhaustive manner the grounds upon which freedom of religious expression may be restricted, and further stipulates that any such restriction must be prescribed by law. Moreover, under the interpretation of international law, such laws must be drafted with sufficient precision to allow an ordinary person to foresee the legal consequences of their conduct.


However, the concept of “public welfare” not only does not appear among the limited grounds for restriction enumerated in Article 18(3), but also lacks clarity in its content. As such, under international law, it cannot serve as a legitimate basis for restricting freedom of religious expression.

How Japan ignored United Nations recommendations.
How Japan ignored United Nations recommendations.

[Reference Provision]

ICCPR Article 18(3)


Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

The Committee laid out in its Comment N° 34 (on freedom of expression):25. For the purposes of paragraph 3, a norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution.


Although it was an opinion concerning freedom of expression, it is understood to also apply to freedom of religious expression.

CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5 18 December 2008Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee JAPAN10. While taking note of the State party’s explanation that “public welfare” cannot be relied on as a ground for placing arbitrary restrictions on human rights, the Committee reiterates its concern that the concept of “public welfare” is vague and open-ended and may permit restrictions exceeding those permissible under the Covenant (art. 2).The State party should adopt legislation defining the concept of “public welfare” specifying that any restrictions placed on the rights guaranteed in the Covenant on grounds of “public welfare” may not exceed those permissible under the Covenant.

20 August 2014 Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of JapanRestriction of fundamental freedoms on grounds of “public welfare” 22. The Committee reiterates its concern that the concept of “public welfare” is vague and open-ended and may permit restrictions exceeding those permissible under the Covenant (arts. 2, 18 and 19). The Committee recalls its previous concluding observations (see CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5, para. 10) and urges the State party to refrain from imposing any restriction on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression unless they fulfil the strict conditions set out in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19.

30 November 2022Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Japan37. Recalling its previous recommendations,17 the Committee calls on the State party to take all the measures necessary: (a) To clearly define the concept of “public welfare”, so as to ensure that any restriction of freedom of thought, conscience or religion or freedom of expression on grounds of “public welfare” are in accordance with those permitted under the Covenant.

 
 
 

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